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ABSTRACT   While estimating regional inequality, many economists use inequality indices 
weighted by regions’ shares in the national population. Despite this approach is widespread, 
its adequacy has not received attention in the regional science literature. This paper proves 
that such approach is conceptually inconsistent, yielding an estimate of interpersonal 
inequality among the whole population of the country rather than an estimate of regional 
inequality. But, as a measure of interpersonal inequality, such an estimate is very rough (up to 
misleading) and not always has an intuitive interpretation. Moreover, the population-weighted 
inequality indices do not meet requirements to an adequate inequality measure.  
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1. Introduction 
Studying economic inequality in a country, one may consider distribution of, say, income 
between individuals or between country’s regions. The latter not only introduces spatial 
dimension in studies of inequality, but it can also reveal important links remaining overlooked 
with treating the country as a whole. For example, while the literature on civil war has found 
little support for a link between individual-level economic inequality and civil war, Deiwiks et 
al. (2012) find strong evidence that regional inequality affects the risk of secessionist conflict. 
In both cases, the same statistical methodology and inequality indices (which amount to a few 
tens) are applied, with the difference that regions rather than individuals are taken as 
observations while estimating regional inequality. However, there is a modification of the 
inequality indices that is applied to measure regional inequality.    
Apparently, Williamson (1965) was the first who put forward the idea of weighting 
indices that measure inequality between regions of a country by regions’ shares in the national 
population. Since then such an approach became fairly widespread in regional studies. 
Publications that use it number in hundreds. Therefore I am able to cite only a small part of 
them, using a dozen of recent journal articles as a ‘sample’. Table 1 tabulates them, reporting 
population-weighted inequality indices applied as well as geographical and temporal coverage 
of respective studies. In this table, CV = coefficient of variation, G = Gini index, Th = Theil 
index, MLD = mean logarithmic deviation,  = standard deviation of logarithms and RMD = 
relative mean deviation. Subscript w indicates that the index is a population-weighted one.   
Most studies from Table 1 use regional GDP per capita as a well-being indicator. An 
exception is Doran & Jordan (2013) who exploit regional gross value added per capita; a few 
studies consider some additional indicators. The table shows that the application of the 
population-weighted inequality indices is greatly varied both in geographical terms and time 
spans (note that if different countries are involved in a study, the case at hand is not 
international inequality; the study deals with regional inequalities in a respective set of 
countries). Inequality indices employed are also manifold. The most popular ones are the 
coefficient of variation, Gini and Theil indices (many other, ‘out of sample’, papers confirm 
this). Therefore only these three indices will be dealt with in what follows. It should be noted 
that the population-weighted indices are present not only in the literature on economic 
inequality; they find use in studies of inequality in the areas of health care, education, energy 
policy, etc.  
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Table 1. Selected recent studies that use population-weighted inequality indices.  
 
Author(s) Weighted index(es) 
employed 
Geographical 
coverage 
Time span 
Doran & Jordan (2013) Thw 14 EU countries 
(NUTS 2 regions) 
1980–2009 
Enflo & Rosés (2015) MLDw Sweden 1860–2000
Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose 
(2014) 
Thw,  CVw, MLDw, w 22 emerging 
countries 
1990–2006
Kyriacou & Roca-Sagalés (2014) CVw, MLDw, w 22 OECD countries 1990–2005
Lessmann (2014) CVw 56 countries 1980–2009
Li & Gibson (2013) Gw, CVw, Thw China 1990–2010
Martínez-Galarraga et al. (2015) Thw Spain 1860–2000
Mussini (2015) Gw 28 EU countries 
(NUTS 3 regions) 
2003–2011
Petrakos & Psycharis (2016) CVw Greece 2000–2012
Sacchi & Salotti (2014) CVw, w, MLDw 21 OECD countries 1981–2005
Wijerathna et al. (2014) Gw, CVw, RMDw Sri Lanka 1996–2011
Zubarevich & Safronov (2011) Gw, CVw Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan 
1998–2009
 
Williamson did not provide a more or less detailed substantiation of his idea, merely 
noted that an unweighted inequality index “will be determined in part by the somewhat 
arbitrary political definition of regional units” and “[t]he preference for an unweighted index 
over a weighted one, we think, is indefensible” (Williamson, 1965, pp. 11, 34). Nor such 
substantiations appeared within next 50 years. Even a handbook chapter on measuring 
regional divides only asserts that the use of unweighted inequality indices “may lead to 
unrealistic results in certain cases, affecting our perception of convergence or divergence 
trends” (Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose, 2009, p. 332), providing no proof or example. The only 
attempt to explore properties of the population-weighted indices is due to Portnov & 
Felsenstein (2010); it will be discussed in Section 5. Yet even Williamson’s brief notes cited 
are open to question.  
First, the political division of a country is the reality which regional researchers should 
deal with, irrespective of whether they believe it to be ‘somewhat arbitrary’ or ‘natural’. 
Certainly, they may discuss its shortcomings and find ways of improvement, but it is a quite 
different story unrelated to the issue of regional inequality. Therefore the desire for 
‘adjustment’ of existing political division through assigning less importance to lesser 
populated regions seems strange. 
Second, why do we need taking into account differences in regional population at all? 
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But we can estimate inequality among groups in country’s population without regard for sizes 
of these groups. For instance, while estimating wage inequality between industrial workers, 
builders, teachers, lawyers and so on, we do not care about what shares of these occupational 
groups in the total population (or employees) are. What is a fundamental difference between 
this and the case when each population group consists of inhabitants of one region?   
Third, on closer inspection results of estimating inequality with the use of population-
weighted indices look striking; they may prove to be evidently unrealistic. The next section 
provides a glowing example. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that the application of population-weighted indices 
for measuring regional inequality is nothing but a fallacy. The main point is that they measure 
not inequality between regions but something else and therefore yield distorted estimates of 
regional inequality. In other words, the unweghted and weighted indices measure different 
phenomena. Albeit Williamson’s approach has received some criticism (which will be 
discussed in Section 5), the literature has overlooked this point. Moreover, this paper proves 
that these indices do not meet requirements to an adequate inequality measure. 
The statement above seemingly contradicts the fact that the approach under 
consideration is commonly employed in the literature. However, this fact in no way evidences 
adequacy of the approach. For instance, analyzing -convergence is even more widespread (in 
the literature on economic growth and inequality); relevant publications number in thousands. 
Nonetheless, a number of authors, e.g. Friedman (1992), Quah (1993) and Wodon & Yitzhaki 
(2006), proved invalidity of this methodology. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reveals the true sense of 
inequality estimates obtained with the use of the population-weighted indices. Section 3 
considers the issues of biases in the weighted indices and interpretability of these indices. 
Section 4 analyzes properties of the population-weighted indices, providing proofs that they 
violate three important axioms. Section 5 discusses arguments against and in favour of the 
population weighting found in the literature. Section 6 summarizes conclusions drawn in the 
paper.   
 
2. What Do Population-Weighted Indices Measure? 
Consider cross-region income distribution y = (yi), i = 1, …, m; yi = per capita income in 
region i and y  = the arithmetic average of regional per capita incomes ( myyy m /)...( 1  ). 
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Then the coefficient of variation measuring regional inequality has the form 
y
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m
i i  1 2 /)( .             (1) 
Now let Ni = population of region i; N = population of the country; ni = Ni/N = region’s 
share in the national population (region’s weight); n = (ni) will be called population distribution. 
The weighted average of regional per capita incomes ( mmw ynyny  ...11)( ) is denoted by 
)(wy . It exactly equals the national per capita income: NYNYYy mw //)...( 1)(  , where Yi 
stands for region’s total income (Yi = Niyi) and Y represents the national total income. Under 
this notation, the Williamson coefficient of variation (Williamson, 1965, p. 11) – sometimes 
called the Williamson index – looks like 
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In some cases, the weighting by population is present in the Theil index implicitly. For 
example, Doran & Jordan (2013, p. 25–26) construct the index from regions’ shares of total 
income, Yi/Y, and regions’ shares of total population, Ni/N. Martínez-Galarraga et al. (2015, p. 
510) use a similar way. It is easily seen that such index is equivalent to that represented by 
Formula (6): 
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Let us apply the population-weighted indices to estimate regional inequality in a simple 
two-region case. Consider two Chinese regions, mainland China as a whole (in Chinese, Dàlù) 
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and Macao, the Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (and the 
richest territory of the world). In hoary antiquity, when the Portuguese occupied as large part 
of the Chinese territory as they could (or needed), Macao might be deemed a ‘somewhat 
arbitrary’ regional unit. Nowadays, it is quite natural, as Macao has its own currency, and 
citizens of China from other regions need visa to get there. Table 2 reports data on these 
regions. 
 
Table 2. Per capita income and population in mainland China and Macao in 2014.  
 
Region PPP-adjusted GDP per 
capita (yi), current 
international dollars1 
Population (Ni), 
million people2 
Region weight (ni) 
Mainland China 13,217 1,376.049 0.999573 
Macao 139,767 0.588 0.000427 
 
Estimating income inequality between mainland China and Macao, we get results listed 
in Table 3. It reports values of the population-weighted coefficient of variation and Gini and 
Theil indices defined by Formulae (2), (5) and (6) as well as values of the unweighted indices 
according to Formulae (1), (3) and (4). For comparability sake, the table also reports these 
indices standardized so that they range from 0 to 1. That is, an index is divided by its 
maximum corresponding to perfect inequality. For our case of two observations, the maxima 
of CV, G and Th are respectively 1, 0.5 and log(2). The maxima of CVw, Gw and Thw 
approximately equal 1, 48.4 and 7.8; the way of computing these maxima will be explained in 
Section 4 and summarized in its Table 8. 
 
Table 3. Estimates of income inequality between mainland China and Macao.  
 
Index Population-weighted Unweighted  
 Raw Standardized Raw Standardized
Coefficient of variation 0.197 0.004 0.827 0.827 
Gini index 0.004 0.004 0.414 0.827 
Theil index 0.007 0.001 0.399 0.576 
Average income )(wy = 13,721 y = 76,492 
                                                          
1 Data source: World development indicators. – GDP per capita, PPP (current international $). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD (Accessed Sept. 26, 2015). 
2 Data source: World population prospects: the 2015 revision, key findings and advance tables, 
Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP.241, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division, New York, 2015, p. 13. 
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While the unweighted indices indicate a high degree of inequality, the population-
weighted ones yield the reverse pattern. The standardized values of CVw and Gw are equal to 
0.4% in percentage terms; and standardized Thw is even less than 0.1%. This suggests that 
there is (almost) no income inequality between the average mainland Chinese and average 
inhabitant of Macao. Indeed, our perception of spatial inequality is greatly distorted, but in the 
sense opposite to the above-cited view of Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose (2009, p. 332): it is the 
population weighting that gives rise to distortions.  
In the two-region case, the result evidently contradicts common sense. A sufficiently 
great number of regions in empirical studies masks, as a rule, such absurdities, creating an 
impression that estimates of inequality with the use of the population weighting are 
reasonable.  
Then what is the reason for that low inequality suggested by the population-weighted 
inequality indices in the above example?  What is the sense of the estimates obtained? To 
understand what the weighted indices measure, let us estimate inequality among all citizens of 
a country, basing on cross-region income distribution. The ‘national’ coefficient of variation 
(CVnat) with yl standing for personal income of l-th citizen of the country looks like 
y
Nyy
CV
N
l l
nat
   1 2 /)( . 
Obviously, the population-average income in this formula – national per capita income, 
Nyyy N /)...( 1   – equals the weighted average of regional per capita incomes, )(wy . 
Lacking information on intra-regional income distributions, we are forced to assume that all 
inhabitants of a region have the same income equalling per capita income in this region. Then 
square deviations 2)( )( wl yy   are uniform for all l relating to inhabitants of the same region, 
say i. Hence, their sum over all inhabitants of the region is iwi Nyy
2
)( )(  . Summing up such 
sums over all regions, we come to the Williamson coefficient of variation: 
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Thus, the population-weighted coefficient of variation is not a measure of inequality 
between regions; instead, it measures national inequality, i.e. interpersonal inequality in the 
whole population of the country. In doing so, it does not (and cannot) take into account intra-
regional inequalities. Certainly, this relates not only to the coefficient of variation but to any other 
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inequality index (maybe, except for those based on partial information from cross-region income 
distributions, e.g. the relative range of disparities, iiii yyR min/max , interquartile range, and the 
like; however, it seems that the weighting is hardly applicable to them); the proof is simple and 
similar to the above one. (Of course, we need not necessarily take an entire country; the conclusion 
still holds if we consider any subset of regions as a ‘country’.) 
This explains the sense of results obtained with the population-weighted indices in Table 3. 
These measure inequality between inhabitants of united mainland China and Macao. Provided that 
inequality within mainland China is zero (as all its inhabitants are supposed to have the same 
income), adding less than one million people – even with extremely high income – to its 1.4-
billion population can increase the degree of the overall inequality only slightly.   
It is seen that there is a conceptual distinction between the unweighted and population-
weighted estimates of inequality; they measure different phenomena. The unweighted index 
measures inequality between regions (considered as a whole), while the weighted one measures 
inequality between all country’s citizens.  
Considering inequality between regions, all of them enjoy equal rights in the sense that all yi 
are equiprobable (i.e. the probability of finding income yi in a randomly chosen region is the same 
for all i and equals 1/m). Albeit speaking of regions, we actually deal with individuals, 
representative (or ‘average’, i.e. having the region-average income) inhabitant of each region. 
While estimating regional inequality, we compare their incomes without regard for how many 
people live in respective regions (like we do while comparing wages across occupations). Indeed, 
the fact that the average inhabitant of Macao is almost 11 times richer than the average mainland 
Chinese in no way changes because of the fact that the population of Macao is 2,340 times smaller 
than the population of mainland China. 
Introducing regional weights implies that a region is represented by all its inhabitants rather 
than by one ‘average’ inhabitant. That is, we consider region i as a group of Ni people, each 
individual within the group having income yi. Then the probability of yi differs across regions, 
becoming proportional to their populations, ni. Thus, (ni) is a proxy of the personal-income 
distribution in the country. In fact, we ‘split’ regions into their individual inhabitants so that all 
they in aggregate represent the whole population of the country, as Figure 1 illustrates, and 
estimate inequality between these N persons, so inevitably substituting regional inequality for 
interpersonal one. However, lacking information on income differences within regions, we 
consider inhabitants of each region as identical and regions as internally homogeneous groups of 
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people. Thus we arrive at a grouping of the whole country’s population into income classes (yi) of 
different sizes (Ni). The regional division matters no more; the impression that the case at hand is 
inequality between regions is but an illusion owing to that the grouping proceeds from the data by 
region. An estimate of the national inequality obtained with such grouping is very crude, since it 
neglects inequality within regions and – what is much more important – the income classes yi 
(constructed from cross-region data) in fact heavily overlap because of overlapping intra-regional 
income distributions. (This issue is considered in more detail in the next section.)    
 
 
Figure 1. Population of the country as a set of regional populations (assuming population of 
each region to be income homogeneous, yl = yi for Ki + 1  l  Ki + Ni). 
Note: Ki = N1 + …+ Ni–1; K1 = 0. 
 
It follows herefrom that a population-weighted estimate of inequality is biased with regard 
to estimates of both regional inequality (as it measures a different value) and interpersonal 
inequality (as it does not take account of within-region income disparities). In both cases, the result 
can be misleading as the example of two Chinese regions demonstrates.  
The bias can have either direction depending on a particular combination of regional per 
capita incomes and populations. Williamson (1965, p. 12) reports values of both weighted and 
unweighted coefficient of variation estimated on regional data from 24 countries. Regional 
inequality estimated by CVw proves to be overstated in about a half of countries, and understated in 
another half. The biases (relative to the unweighted estimates) range from –52.6% (in India) to 
+37.6% (in Puerto Fico). The case of India is an example of quite misleading result in an 
y 
yi 
ym 
y1 
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actual study (covering 18 regions): the population-weighted index understates the extent of 
regional inequality there by more than a half. Differences in the trends also can occur. Figure 2 
depicts the evolution of inequality in Australia over 11 years according to the unweghted and 
population-weighted coefficient of variation. The estimates are computed from Williamson’s 
(1965, p. 48) data. It is seen that the trends of CV and CVw are sometimes opposite, e.g. in the 
whole period of 1952/53 to 1958/59. Regional inequality, measured by CV, fell by 4.7% in 
1959/60 as compared to 1949/50, while the weighted estimates suggest a rise by 20.6%. And 
so we come to different – up to opposite – conclusions depending on the use of unweghted or 
population-weighted measures. 
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Figure 2. Paths of the weighted and unweighted coefficient of variation in Australia. 
 
One more evidence is due to Petrakos & Psycharis (2016). They estimate the evolution 
of regional inequality in Greece across its NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 regions over 2000–2012, 
using both population-weighted and unweighted coefficient of variation. The trend of CVw is 
upward, while CV has either a downward trend (in the case of NUTS 3 regions) or is stable 
(for NUTS 2 regions). Thus, if one considered the weighted estimates, the conclusion would 
be that regional inequality rises, whereas actually it remains unchanged or even decreases. 
There is a prominent example in the international context. Milanovic (2012) estimates 
income inequality (measured by the Gini index) between counties and in the world as a whole 
over 1952–2006. In the latter case, he uses the index weighted by populations of the countries. 
However, unlike most (if not all) regional studies applying population-weighted measures, he 
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explicitly interpret it as an approximate measure of global inequality (inequality across world 
individuals) rather than an estimate of international (cross-country) inequality, realizing that it 
is not only a rough, but possibly misleading, estimate. The only reason for application of the 
weighted index is that household survey data for a sufficient number of countries are not 
available for the period prior to 1980s (Milanovic, 2012, p. 8). The trends of the unweighted 
and weighted Gini indices are found to have opposite directions, upward for the former and 
downward for the latter (the both become downward only since 2000). Thus, if one drew 
conclusions on dynamics of international inequality from the weighted estimates, they would 
be quite opposite to the real pattern. As regards interpersonal inequality, Milanovic (2012, p. 
14) also reports estimates of global inequality for 1988–2005 based on household survey data 
(i.e. taking into account income distributions within countries). These prove to be, first, much 
higher that the weighted estimates, and, second, sliding upward (although only slightly) rather 
than downward. Thus, estimates obtained with the use of the weighted Gini index turn out to 
be really misleading with respect to inequality both between countries and between world 
individuals. 
 
3. Population-Weighted Indices as Measures of Interpersonal Inequality   
As it has been mentioned in the previous section, an estimate of interpersonal inequality in the 
country or any subset of regions with the use of the population-weighted indices is biased 
because of neglecting inequality within regions. An actual ‘splitting’ regions into their 
individual inhabitants would yield something like a pattern depicted in Figure 3 (individuals 
within each region are arranged according to their personal incomes), which fundamentally differs 
from the pattern supposed in Figure 1.  
Individuals in a region may have incomes that are near or even coincide with incomes of 
inhabitants of other regions, which implies that individuals from the same region in fact fall into 
different income classes and individuals from different regions may fall into the same income 
classes. In other words, regional income distributions overlap with one another. Because of this 
overlapping the division of country’s population into income classes according to regional per 
capita income – like in Figure 1 – turns out improper, resulting in inadequate estimation of 
inequality in the country. To correctly estimate inequality between N persons making up the 
population of the country, all they should be rearranged by income within the whole country and 
then grouped (irrespective of their regions of origin) into some actual income classes. 
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Figure 3. Population of the country as a set of regional populations (actual pattern). 
Note: Ki = N1 + …+ Ni–1; K1 = 0. 
 
Mussini (2015) estimates inequality between NUTS 3 regions in the EU-28 over 2003–
2011 (applying the population-weighted Gini index) and decomposes its changes into those 
caused by population change, re-ranking of regions and growth of regional per capita incomes. 
In the light of the above considerations the intuitive sense of the first component becomes 
absolutely obscure. In fact, inequality within population of the whole geographical entity 
comprising of NUTS 3 regions is measured. Imagine that the cross-individual income 
distribution in this entity remains invariant while the cross-region population distribution 
changes. Then the effect of population change in the decomposition of inequality change 
reflects nothing but a result of replacing one improper division of the population into income 
classes by another, also improper, one.  
To judge the extent of distortions in estimates of interpersonal inequality caused by the 
application of population-weighted indices, it is convenient to use data drawn from the 
Russian official statistics. These data make it possible to do this by real examples with small 
numbers of regions.    
At present, there are two regions in Russia, the Arkhangelsk Oblast and Tyumen Oblast, 
that include national entities, so called autonomous okrugs (hereafter, AO). The Arkhangelsk 
Oblast includes the Nenets AO, and the Tyumen Oblast includes Khanty-Mansi AO and 
Yamalo-Nenets AO. Statistical data on personal income distribution and inequality are 
available for each oblast as a whole and all its parts (‘subregions’), namely, AO(s) and the 
y 
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oblast excluding AO(s); for brevity, the latter will be called Southern part. Based on such data, 
we can compare actual estimates of inequality in the whole region with those obtained with 
the use of population-weighted index for these two-subregion and three-subregion cases. Table 
4 tabulates the relevant data.     
 
Table 4. Income and population in the Arkhangelsk and Tyumen Oblasts in 2014.  
 
Personal income, Russian 
rubles (RUR) per month 3 
i Region/subregion  
Per capita 
(yi)  
Median 
(Mdi) 
Modal 
(Moi) 
Gini 
index4 
Population, 
thousand 
people, 
annual 
average5 
Subregion 
weight  
(ni) 
0 Arkhangelsk Oblast 29,432 23,125 14,276 0.378 1,187.6
1 Nenets AO 66,491 48,281 25,457 0.429 43.2 0.036
2 Southern part 28,033 22,354 14,213 0.368 1,144.4 0.964
0 Tyumen Oblast 38,523 27,508 14,026 0.439 3,563.8
1 Khanty-Mansi AO 41,503 30,440 16,375 0.423 1,604.7 0.450
2 Yamalo-Nenets AO 61,252 44,517 23,515 0.429 539.8 0.151
3 Southern part 26,509 20,052 11,473 0.404 1,419.3 0.398
 
 
The Russian statistical agency, Rosstat (formerly, Goskomstat), models income 
distributions in regions and the whole country as log-normal ones (Goskomstat of Russia, 
1996, p. 79). The distribution parameters from Table 4 enable to restore log-normal income 
distributions for subregions of the regions under consideration, fi(y).6 Figure 4 (a) and (c) 
depicts these distributions.  
 
                                                          
3 Data source: Mean, median and modal level of population’s money incomes in Russia as a 
whole and subjects of the Russian Federation for 2014. Web site of the Federal State Statistics 
Service of the Russian Federation. 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/bednost/tabl/1-2-6.doc (Accessed Sept. 15, 
2016). [In Russian.] 
4 Data source: Distribution of total money incomes and description of differentiation of 
population’s money incomes in Russia as a whole and subjects of the Russian Federation for 
2014. Web site of the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation. 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/bednost/tabl/1-2-4.doc (Accessed Sept. 15, 
2016). [In Russian.] 
5 Data source: Regions of Russia. Socio-Economic Indicators. 2015. Moscow, Rosstat, 2015. Pp. 
39–40. [In Russian.]  
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Figure 4. Income distributions in the Arkhangelsk and Tyumen Oblasts. 
 
  Estimating inequality in the whole country or – as in our case – a multi-regional entity  
from per capita incomes only (like the population-weighted indices do), a within-(sub)region 
income distribution is in fact represented as the delta function (x) which is zero everywhere 
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except at zero and (0) =  so that   1)( dxx (see, e.g., Kanwal, 2004).7  Denote such 
distribution in (sub)region i by gi(); then  gi(y) =  (y – yi). These distributions are represented 
in Figure 4 by vertical arrows starting at yi, a number near the arrowhead specifying the area 
under the function.  
The income distribution in the whole region can be computed either in the same way as 
the subregional distributions (from parameters of the distribution) or equally well as the 
weighted sum of subregional distributions,  mi ii yfnyf 10 )()( . Similarly,  
   mi iimi ii yynygnyg 110 )()()(  .            (7) 
Figure 4 (b) and (d) shows both f0(y) and g0(y). 
Given g0(y), the expectation of y is      mi wiimi ii yyndyyynyyE 1 )(0 10 )()(  ; 
the variance is      mi wiimi ii yyndyyynyEyyVar 1 2)(0 1200 )()())(()(  . Then the 
coefficient of variation coincides with that given by Formula (2), Var0(y)1/2/E0 (y) = CVw. 
Computing the Theil index for continuous distribution, we again get its weighted version, 
wThdyygyE
y
yE
y  )())(ln()( 00 00 . Expressing the Gini index as )(/))(1)(( 000 0 yEdyyFyF 

 
(Yitzhaki & Schechtman, 2013, pp. 15–16 and 26), where F0(y) is the cumulative distribution 
function,  dyygyF )()( 00 , we arrive at Gw. (The derivation needs cumbersome mathematics 
and therefore is not reported.) Using f0(y) instead g0(y) in the above calculations, we would get 
the unweighted inequality indices, CV, Th and G, that measure inequality of the whole 
population of a region for the case of continuous income distribution. (This is one more proof 
of the fact that the population-weighted indices measure inequality between all individuals, 
and not between regions.)  
It is obvious – and clearly seen in Figure 4 (b) and (d) – that the approximation of the 
actual income distribution f0(y) by the weighted sum of delta functions, g0(y), is overly rough 
and therefore will never yield correct estimates of population’s inequality. In Table 5, the 
population-weighted estimates, Gw, are compared with the estimates of inequality between 
subregions, G, and estimates of region’s population inequality labelled Gpop. Because of small 
                                                          
7 The delta function can be viewed as a limit: )2/exp(
2
1lim)( 22
0
  xx   . 
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numbers of observations, G and Gw are standardized to range from 0 to 1 in order to make 
them comparable across regions. For the Arkhangelsk Oblast, the normalizing factor equals 2 
for G and 1/(1 – n1 ) = 1/0.964 for Gw; for the Tyumen Oblast, it is equal to 3/2 and 1/(1 – n2) 
= 1/0.849, respectively (for explanation, see Table 8 in the next section).  
 
Table 5. Estimates of inequality in the Arkhangelsk and Tyumen Oblasts.  
 
Region Measure Gini index,  
raw / standardized 
Average 
income, RUR 
Arkhangelsk Oblast Inter-subregional inequality (G) 0.203 / 0.407 y =  47,262
 Population-weighted estimate (Gw) 0.046 / 0.048 )(wy = 29,432
 Population’s inequality (Gpop)* 0.378 
Tyumen Oblast Inter-subregional inequality (G) 0.179 / 0.269 y = 43,088
 Population-weighted estimate (Gw) 0.159 / 0.188 )(wy = 38,523
 Population’s inequality (Gpop)* 0.439 
* The official estimate from Table 4. 
 
The case of the Arkhangelsk Oblast resembles the example of China in the previous 
section. Like in that example, there are two territorial units, one with big population and 
relatively small income per capita, and one with small population (3.6% of the total) and high 
income per capita (about 2.4 times higher than in the first unit). Although the difference 
between these subregions is not that dramatic as between mainland China and Macao, the 
estimation results are qualitatively similar. The weighted Gini index suggests low inequality, 
4.8% in percentage terms, while inequality between the Nenets AO and southern part of the 
Arkhangelsk Oblast – measured by the unweighted index – is rather high, 40.7%. The latter 
reflects the fact that the average inhabitant of the Nenets AO is 2.4 times richer than the 
average inhabitant of the southern part of the oblast. As for population’s inequality, it equals 
37.8%, only one percent point higher than inequality in the southern part of the Arkhangelsk 
Oblast (see Table 4). A minor contribution of the Nenets AO to inequality in the whole oblast 
is just due to its small population. As it is seen in Figure 4, the overall income distribution in 
the whole Arkhangelsk Oblast, Figure 4 (b), differs from that in its southern part in Figure 4 
(a) only slightly. The weighted Gini index – equaling 4.8% – fails to provide more or less 
adequate approximation of population’s inequality in the whole oblast as well. The weighted 
index severely understates inequality between both subregions and inhabitants of the whole 
Arkhangelsk Oblast.    
The case of the Tyumen Oblast involves three territorial units. They are closer to one 
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another, both in incomes per capita and weights, than in the previous case. Smaller difference 
in incomes per capita results in smaller inequality between subregions (measured by G). The 
weighted index again is understated as compared with inequality between subregions and 
inhabitants of the whole Tyumen Oblast.  
The patterns provided by G and Gpop and the differences between them in the 
Arkhangelsk and Tyumen Oblasts can be easily explained. High inequality between 
subregions of the Arkhangelsk Oblast is due to great difference in income per capita between 
them. Interpersonal inequality is smaller than regional one, remaining approximately close to 
inequality in the southern part of the oblast, since adding rich (on average) but small 
population of the Nenets AO only slightly changes the income distribution. In the Tyumen 
Oblast, inequality between subregions is lower because of lesser differences in incomes per 
capita. At the same time, inequality of the whole population of the oblast, Gpop, is higher than 
regional one, G, and rises as compared to inequality in each subregion. The reason is the 
unification of poor on average population of the southern part of the oblast with richer on 
average population of AOs, population sizes of regions being comparable. As regards results 
suggested by Gw, they hardly can be intuitively explained.          
It is worth noting that even the interpretation of a population-weighted inequality index 
as an approximate measure of interpersonal inequality of the whole country’s population is not 
always true. It holds only regarding indicators which can be applied to an individual, e.g. 
personal income, wage, housing, education, etc. Otherwise the meaning of the population-
weighted index is obscure. Estimating regional income inequality, many authors use regional 
GDP per capita to characterize incomes in regions. However, there is no inequality in the 
national GDP (as the total of regional GDPs) per capita between country’s citizens. There are 
many other indicators that characterize situation of a region, but cannot be applied to its 
certain inhabitant, e.g. birth rate, investment per capita, crime rate, etc. In such cases, the 
population-weighted inequality indices have no intuitive interpretation at all; it is totally 
incomprehensible what they measure. 
For example, Zubarevich & Safronov (2011) estimate, in addition to income inequality, 
regional inequalities in investment per capita, unemployment rate and poverty rate. Again, 
there is no, e.g. unemployment inequality between country’s inhabitants; only the national 
average unemployment rate exists. Consider a simple example. A country consists of two 
regions. Labouring population numbers 15 million people in the first region and 5 million in 
the second; unemployment rates are 40% and 20%, respectively. Then the unemployment rate 
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in the country is 35%. With some trick, we can measure ‘unemployment inequality’ of the 
total labouring population. A person can be either employed, yi =1, or unemployed, yi =0. 
Measuring unemployment inequality of the given 20 million persons with the Gini index over 
so quantified {yi}, we get Gnat = 0.35, exactly the country-average unemployment rate. It can 
be easily checked that this is not a coincidence. Provided that the variable is binary, the Gini 
index always gives the percentage of zeros. At the same time, the population-weighted 
estimate yields Gw = 0.107; being standardized, it equals 0.107/(1 – 0.25) = 0.143. Both 
figures are far from the overall inequality Gnat. (As well as they are far from inequality 
between regions, Gw = 0.167, the standardized value equalling 0.167/0.5 = 0.333.)    
 
4. Some Properties of the Population-Weighted Indices 
An adequate inequality index should satisfy a number of axioms, i.e. desirable properties of an 
inequality measure (see, e.g. Cowell, 2000). Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose (2009, pp. 332–333) 
argue – with no proof – that a number of the population-weighted inequality indices, including 
the coefficient of variation and Gini and Theil indices, fulfil the basic axioms, namely, scale 
invariance, population principle, anonymity and principle of transfers (the Pigou-Dalton 
principle). Similar assertions can be found in Kyriacou & Roca-Sagalés (2014, p. 188–189), 
Lessmann (2014, p. 37), Sacchi & Salotti (2014, p. 148–149) and elsewhere.  
Indeed, these indices are scale-invariant; the check is easy and straightforward. As 
regards the population principle, anonymity (symmetry) principle and principle of transfers, 
the population-weighted inequality indices violate them (while their unweighted counterparts 
do satisfy).  
The population principle (or replication invariance) states that a simple replication of the 
sample under consideration should not change the value of the inequality index. Let us 
replicate the income distribution (yi), along with the population distribution (ni), R times, 
indicating new values of variables by superscript (R). The population-weighted coefficient of 
variation takes the form 2/)1( 2)(  RRCVCV wRw ; it increases with rising R. The 
weighted Gini index becomes R times greater: w
R
w RGG )( . The weighted Theil index, 
contrastingly, diminishes: )log()( RThTh w
R
w  , taking on negative values. (Note that the 
weighted average also changes because of replication: )(
)(
)( w
R
w yRy  ). 
The violation of the anonymity and transfer principles will be proved below for the 
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population-weighted coefficient of variation. Such proofs for the population-weighted Gini 
and Theil indices need more cumbersome mathematics; therefore only numerical examples 
will illustrate violations of these axioms by them. 
Adjusting Jenkins & van Kerm’s (2009, p. 52) definition to the case of regions, the 
anonymity principle requires the inequality index to depend only on per capita income values 
used to construct it and not additional information such as what the region is with a particular 
per capita income or what regional populations are. In other words, the index must be 
invariant to any permutation of income observations.  
Consider a cross-region income distribution y = (y1,…, yN) and its permutation y*, i.e. y = 
(…, yi, …, yk, …) and y* = (…, yk, …, yi, …); the rest elements in y* remain the same as in y; 
hereafter yk > yi. One can expect the value of the population-weighted inequality index to 
change under such a transformation if for no other reason than it changes the weighted 
average: 
))(()()*()( ikkiwww yynnyyy  .           (8) 
It is seen that the weighted average remains intact only in the trivial case of ni = nk.  
The change in the population-weighted coefficient of variation is characterized by the 
following equation: 
))2((
)(
)()( 2
)(
)(
2
)()(2
)()(
)(2
*
22
w
w
wwki
ww
w
www y
y
yyyy
yy
y
yCVyCVCV 
 ,      (9) 
where )(
2
wy  is the weighted average of squared incomes and 
2
)(wy  is the square of the 
weighted average; )(wy  is defined by Formula (8). Note that 1)(/ 22 )()(2  yCVyy www ; hence, 
it always (given that yk  yi) exceeds unity. Thus, 2wCV  depends on six variables: yi, yk, ni, nk, 
)(wy , and )(
2
wy . (This number may be reduced by one, replacing the latter two variables with 
CVw(y).) The signs of the relationship 
1),,,(1
2 )(
2
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2
2
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w
ww
ki yynnyyH
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yy  , ,  
and )(wy  determine the sign of 2wCV , hence the direction of change in the inequality 
measure: )sgn()1)(sgn()sgn( )(
2
ww yHCV  . Table 6 shows different possible cases. 
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Table 6. Permutation-induced changes in the population-weighted coefficient of variation. 
 
 ni > nk ( 0)(  wy ) ni < nk ( 0)(  wy ) 
H() > 1 CVw increases CVw decreases 
H() < 1 CVw decreases CVw increases 
 
Given too many variables in H(), its behaviour is not amenable to more or less 
comprehensive formal analysis. It is possible for some particular cases only. For instance, if both yi 
and yk are less than the weighted average and ni > nk, then H() < 1 knowingly holds and CVw 
diminishes.  
In principle, the case of 02  wCV  is possible as well. Let all regions except i and k have 
the same per capita income yr. Then we can aggregate them into a single ‘region’ r with 
income yr and weight nr = 1 – (ni + nk). (Such a ‘region’ will be used elsewhere below.) In this 
instance H() = F(yi, yk, ni, nk; yr). Keeping all variables except yr constant, we can find the 
value of yr such that H(yr) = 1. Equation H(yr) = 1 is a cubic one with respect to yr; its closed-
form solution is very cumbersome and therefore is not reported. (In fact, we can dispense with 
it, solving the equation numerically.) This equation may have a real positive root, albeit not 
always. However, no significance should be attached to this fact. First, probability of finding 
an actual cross-region income distribution (along with the population distribution) that 
satisfies H() = 1 even for some single pair of i and k seems to be close to zero. Second, 
particular cases of satisfying the anonymity principle do not matter at all, while the only (non-
degenerate) case – even a single numerical example – of its violation would evidence that the 
inequality index under consideration does have this unpleasant property. 
Table 7 provides numerical examples that illustrate four cases listed in Table 4 and the 
case of no change in the population-weighted coefficient of variation.  
Table 7 tabulates three income distributions and their permutations – (A), (B) and (C), 
the population distribution n = (nj) being uniform across these. Therefore, 0)(  wy  holds for 
all three cases of transition from y to y*. However, we can also consider reverse transitions 
from y* to y, exchanging indices i and k; in these transitions, 0)(  wy . Along with the 
coefficient of variation, the table reports the population-weighted Gini and Theil indices. 
Besides, for comparison sake, it also reports values of unweighted inequality indices. 
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Table 7. Permutation-induced changes in the population-weighted inequality indices. 
 
(A) (B) (C) Region 
index 
n 
y y* y y* y y* 
i 0.15 150 300 150 300 150 300 
k 0.05 300 150 300 150 300 150 
r 0.80 400 400 100 100 218.9 218.9 
)(wy   357.5 372.5 117.5 132.5 212.62 227.62 
CVw  0.251 0.167 0.387 0.537 0.149 0.149 
Gw  0.098 0.062 0.129 0.205 0.059 0.060 
Thw  0.039 0.017 0.057 0.115 0.011 0.011 
CV  0.363 0.464 0.275 
G  0.196 0.242 0.149 
Th  0.070 0.104 0.038 
 
Case (A) is that of diminishing values of the population-weighted inequality measures 
caused by the exchange of incomes between two regions; H() < 1 here. The decrease is fairly 
sizeable, equalling more than one third for CVw and more than a half for Thw. Considering the 
reverse transition, we have 0)(  wy  and H() > 1; the permutation of regional incomes causes 
the weighted inequality indices to rise. In case (B), the effect of permutation in y is an increase 
in the weighted indices, as H() > 1; the reverse permutation has the adverse effect. At last, the 
weighted coefficient of variation does not change under the permutation in case (C). 
Interestingly, the weighted Gini and Theil indices are also near-invariant in this case: Gw = 
3.710–4 and Thw = 5.510–4. Comparing values of the respective weighted and unweighted 
indices in Table 3, we can see that the weighting leads to significant undervaluation of 
inequality, except for Thw(y*) and CVw(y*) in case (B).  
Violation of the anonymity principle by the population-weighted inequality indices has 
an important corollary. Lessmann (2014, p. 37) notes that the Theil index is not applicable for 
cross-country comparison of inequalities, since its range of values depends on the number of 
regions in a country, m. However, this holds for the coefficient of variation as well: while the 
Theil index ranges from 0 to ln(m), the coefficient of variation ranges from 0 to 1m . For 
example, Williamson’s (1965) results are not comparable across countries, as the number of 
regions varies in his sample from 6 to 75. Thus the upper bound of the unweighted coefficient 
of variation differs between these extreme cases by the factor of more than 3.8. If the 
unweighted Theil index were applied, this ratio would equal 2.4. Albeit the upper bound of the 
Gini index has the limit, it is also variable, equalling (m – 1)/m, which can manifest itself 
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when the number of regions is small. 
Variability of the upper bounds of the inequality indices matters not only for cross-
country comparisons. An inequality index has a maximum in the case of perfect inequality, 
when the only region has a nonzero income. To judge how great inequality is from an estimate 
obtained, we should know how far it is from perfect inequality. Therefore it would be 
desirable to standardize inequality indices, i.e. normalize them to their maxima (the Gini 
coefficient needs such normalization only in cases of a small number of regions, say, less than 
20). However, Theil (1967, p. 92) objects to normalization, giving an example of two 
situations. The first society consists of two individuals, only one of them having nonzero 
income; in the second society, all income belongs to the only of two million persons. The 
second society is evidently much more unequal. Nonetheless, considerations of cross-country 
comparability and uniform ‘benchmark’ of perfect inequality seem more important than 
Theil’s argument (the more so as the number of regions does not differ that dramatically 
across countries). 
The corollary of violating the anonymity principle by the population-weighted inequality 
indices is that they have no unambiguous maxima. Now the value taken on by an index in the 
case of perfect inequality depends on which particular region possesses all country’s income 
(or to which region the only person having nonzero income is placed). Denote such region by 
k. Table 8 summarizes differences between the maxima of inequality indices without and with 
the population weighting.  
 
Table 8. Maxima of unweighted and weighted inequality indices. 
 
Index Unweighted Population-
weighted 
Coefficient of variation 1m  1/1 kn  
Gini index (m – 1)/m 1 – nk 
Theil index log(m) log(1/nk) 
 
We could take the ‘maximum of maxima’, assigning k to the least populated region. (It 
is such maxima that have been used to compute standardized values of the population-
weighted indices in Tables 3 and 5.) All the same, this ‘global maximum’ would depend on 
the cross-region distribution of country’s population. Then the values of a weighted inequality 
index are not comparable even between countries with an equal number of regions. Moreover, 
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such ‘benchmark’ of perfect inequality may vary over time in the same country with varying 
nk (or even k, if some other region becomes the least populated one).  
Let us turn to the principle of transfers which “is usually taken to be indispensable in 
most of the inequality literature” (Cowell, 2000, p. 98). Let cross-region income distribution y 
= (…, yi, …, yk, …) be transformed into y* = (…,y*i = yi + , …, y*k = yk – ,  …), where y*j = 
yj for j  i, k, and 0 <  < max = (yk – yi)/2, thus keeping region k still richer than i. The 
principle of transfers requires the inequality index to decrease under such a transformation. 
This requirement for the weighted coefficient of variation (denoting CVw*  CVw(y*)) can be 
represented as 
0)))(1((1 2*
)*(
**
*)*(
*  kiw
w
kkii
ww
w nnCV
y
ynyn
CVyd
dCV
 .     (10) 
Condition (10) unambiguously holds only if niy*i < nky*k and ni > nk, as both summands 
in the right-hand side of the equation have negative sign. However, as   rises, y*i and y*k 
become progressively closer to each other, which inevitably causes niy*i – nky*k  to change its 
sign to positive. When the signs of summands in the right-hand side of Equation (10) are 
different (in the case of ni < nk they always are), the resulting sign of their sum depends on 
particular combination of y, n and the value of . Then it is not inconceivable that the 
derivative of CVw* is positive somewhere in the definitional domain of , so violating the 
principle of transfers. 
 To show that dCVw*/d > 0 is possible, consider the case when the transfer is close to 
the right bound of its domain,    (yk – yi)/2. Then y*i  y*k  (yk + yi)/2. In this instance, 
provided that ni > nk, dCVw*/d > 0 if )*(2* )1(2/)( wwki yCVyy  . Let )*()1( wi yy   and 
)*()1( wk yy  (note that  may be negative), then the latter inequality looks like 
2
*2/)( wCV  . Such a relationship is fairly realistic. Usually CVw* < 1, therefore  and  
should not be too great. For example, if CVw* = 0.7, the principle of transfers will be violated 
with, say, )*(2.1 wi yy   and )*(8.1 wk yy   in the neighbourhood of )(*3.0 wy , or with 
)*(9.0 wi yy   and )*(1.2 wk yy   near )(*6.0 wy . Note that with ni > nk, a necessary condition 
for dCVw*/d > 0 is exceedance of the weighted average by yk, 
)()()*( )( wkiwwk ynnyyy   . 
Provided that ni < nk, dCVw*/d > 0 if )*(2* )1(2/)( wwki yCVyy  . This inequality 
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obviously holds when both yi and yk are below the weighted average )*(wy , or when   –. It 
also may be true if both variables are above )*(wy , e.g. with )*(1.1 wi yy   and )*(8.1 wk yy   
near )(*35.0 wy , given that CVw* = 0.7. 
Considering CVw* as a function of transfer, CVw(y*) = CVw() (then CVw(y) = CVw(0)), 
we can distinguish four types of its behaviour (depending on particular y and n). They are 
depicted in Figure 5, with CVw() normalized to CVw(0) and  normalized to max.  
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
 max
CV w ( )/CV w (0) 1
2
3
4
1
 
Figure 5. Different types of behaviour of CVw(). 
Note: for all curves, n = (0.15, 0.05, 0,8), yi = 100 and yk = 300; yr = 420 for curve 1, yr = 350 
for curve 2, yr = 300 for curve 3, and yr = 30 for curve 4. 
 
Type 1 is a monotonic rise in the weighted coefficient of variation everywhere in the 
definitional domain of . In type 2, CVw() decreases at first and then begins to rise (i.e. 
dCVw*/d changes its sign from negative to positive). Starting with some , it reaches the 
initial value, CVw(0), and then exceeds it more and more. Type 3 is qualitatively similar to 
type 2, except for CVw() does not reach the initial value by the end of the domain of . At 
last, type 4 is a monotonic decreasing CVw(). 
The weighted Gini and Theil indices have the same four types of behaviour. A 
peculiarity of the Gini index is a break on curve Gw() in some point (instead of a smooth 
inflection) in the case of behaviour of types 2 and 3. However, given the same y and n, Gw() 
and Thw() may differ from CVw() in the type of behaviour. For instance, curves of the 
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weighted Gini index corresponding to curves 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 4 behave according to type 
1; the behaviour is similar only in the case of curve 4. Curves of the weighted Theil index 
corresponding to curves 2, 3 and 4 in Figure 4 have the same type of behaviour, while 
behaviour of type 2 corresponds to curve 1of CVw.     
The violations of the principle of transfers have serious implications for empirical 
studies. Let we study the evolution of income inequality in some country (assume that the 
population distribution remains invariant). Provided that the behaviour of the population-
weighted inequality measure is of type 1, we would observe increasing inequality with income 
gaps between regions of the country becoming progressively smaller over time. In the case of 
behaviour of types 2 and 3, the results will appear even more striking and unaccountable. At 
first, inequality falls with decreasing income gaps, as could be expected; but then from some 
point on, further decrease in the income gaps leads to rise in inequality. 
Certainly, the situation is much more involved in actual empirical studies. For example, 
the population-weighted inequality measure may have varied types of behaviour for different 
region pairs (i, k); besides, an increase in per capita income in the poorer region of a pair is not 
equal, as a rule, to decrease in the richer region. But the above results evidence that in any case 
these features of the population-weighted inequality measures will produce (unpredictable) 
distortions in the pattern of the evolution of inequality. 
Usually (albeit not always), dynamics of inequality obtained with the use of different 
unweighted inequality measures, say, the coefficient of variation, Gini and Theil indices, is 
qualitatively similar, having the same directions of change in inequality and their turning 
points. Since different population-weighted indices computed on the same data may have 
different types of behaviour, they can provide quite diverse patterns of the evolution of 
inequality in a country, depending on a particular index applied.        
Table 9 gives numerical examples of violating the transfer principle for cases (A) ni < nk 
and (B) ni > nk. It tabulates results for the baseline distribution y and its transformations y*() 
with  = 10 and  = 90 (max = 100).  
In case (A), the population-weighted coefficient of variation and Theil index have 
behaviour of type 2. Their values decrease with the small transfer  = 10 and increase with the 
greater transfer  = 90. The weighted Gini index behaves according to type 1, its value rising 
with both transfers. In case (B), all three weighted indices have behaviour of type 2, falling 
with  = 10 and rising with  = 90. Figure 6 illustrates this case graphically for the whole 
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domain of . 
Table 9. Transfer-induced changes in the population-weighted inequality indices. 
 
(A) (B) Region 
index n y y*(10) y*(90) n y y*(10) y*(90) 
i 0.05 100 110 190 0.18 100 110 190 
k 0.15 300 290 210 0.02 300 290 210 
r 0.80 370 370 370 0.80 110 110 110 
)(wy   346.0 345.0 337.0  112.0 120.0 126.4 
CVw  0.178 0.177 0.196  0.242 0.222 0.260 
Gw  0.060 0.062 0.079  0.046 0.031 0.104 
Thw  0.021 0.020 0.022  0.020 0.017 0.030 
CV  0.446 0.424 0.314  0.541 0.499 0.254 
G  0.234 0.225 0.156  0.261 0.235 0.131 
Th  0.114 0.101 0.047  0.136 0.116 0.035 
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Figure 6. Population-weighted indices as functions of transfer. 
Note: the dashed lines correspond to initial levels (with  = 0) of the indices.  
 
5. Contras and Pros 
Williamson’s approach to measuring regional inequality did receive some criticism in the 
literature. Metwally & Jensen (1973) point out:   
Williamson’s coefficient […] fails to take into account either the dispersion of incomes 
nationally, or what is more important in a spatial context, the dispersion of incomes 
within regions. […] It is possible for this coefficient to decrease over time, suggesting a 
convergence in regional mean incomes, while dispersion in actual incomes could show 
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an opposite trend. (Metwally & Jensen, 1973, p. 135) 
As it is seen, the authors mean measuring national (interpersonal) inequality; therefore their 
criticism is beside the point. But Williamson (1965) in no way intended to estimate inequality 
among countries’ populations. There is not a grain of evidence of such purpose in his paper; 
quite the contrary, he highlights throughout the paper that he deals with regional inequality.  
Fisch (1984) raises a similar objection:  
Williamson’s coefficients of variations ignore a […] critical issue in relation to spatial 
inequality: the unequal regional distribution of population by income class. (Fisch, 1984, 
p. 91) 
Again, the case in point is inability of the population-weighted coefficient of variation to 
adequately approximate interpersonal income inequality in the whole country. 
In fact, objections due to Metwally & Jensen (1973) and Fisch (1984) are not those to the 
population weighting. The essence is in that they believe the national inequality rather than 
regional one to be more proper for Williamson’s (1965) research.   
Parr (1974) considers a different aspect; he notes:  
[T]he value of the [Williamson] index is likely to be influenced by the regionalization 
scheme employed, and there will be a tendency for the value of the index to be high 
when the regionalization involves a relatively large number of regions. (Parr, 1974, p. 
84) 
This is so indeed concerning the unweighted coefficient of variation with its maximum rising 
as the square root of the number of regions, but it is not true for the population-weighted index 
in the general case (as it has been shown in the previous section). The further Parr’s note is 
connected with the weighted index though:  
[T]here is no way of knowing whether the official statistical regions on which the index 
is based reflect the extent of spatial income differentiation, given the particular number 
of regions involved. (Parr, 1974, p. 84) 
To manage with this problem, the author suggests a bootstrap procedure of placing a number 
of points, corresponding to the number of official regions, at random over the territory of the 
country, thus obtaining a standard of spatial income differentiation against which the original 
index could be compared. It is not entirely clear what Parr means, but it seems that this 
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procedure would yield something like an approximation of the maximum of 1/1 in .  
Thus, the above considerations do not concern the main sin of the population-weighted 
indices, their failure in providing unbiased estimates of regional inequality (as well as their 
unpleasant properties as inequality measures at all). It is not inconceivable that such criticism 
exists somewhere in the literature; however, I failed in finding it. 
Let us turn to arguments in favour of the weighting inequality indices by population. 
Portnov & Felsenstein (2010) explore the sensitivity of four unweighted and four population-
weighted inequality measures to changes in the ranking, size and number of regions into 
which a country is divided, explicitly treating regions as groups of people. One of their tests 
consists in comparison between two situations that differ in the cross-region population 
distribution and national per capita income, keeping the cross-region income distribution 
invariant. Surprisingly, the values of the unweighted indices change across the situations, 
although they should not, being independent of the population distribution. A closer look 
shows that this is due to the mistaken use of )(wy  instead of y  in calculation of these indices. 
In one more test, the population distribution randomly changes, the cross-region income 
distribution and national per capita income being kept constant. As one would expect, the 
weighted inequality indices react to these changes, while the unweighted ones remain 
constant. The authors believe the latter to be a shortcoming. They conclude: 
These [unweighted] indices may thus lead to spurious results when used for small 
countries, which are often characterized by rapid changes in population patterns. 
(Portnov & Felsenstein, 2010, p. 217) 
They also conclude that the population-weighted indices – the Williamson coefficient of 
variation, Gini index and Coulter coefficient – may be considered as more or less reliable 
regional inequality measures (Portnov & Felsenstein, 2010, pp. 217–218). Both conclusions 
are fallacious. Explicitly treating regions as groups of people, the authors implicitly deal with 
the estimation of interpersonal inequality in the country, misinterpreting it as the estimation of 
regional inequality. Therefore, their results in no way can be deemed a proof of the use of 
weighting. 
Lessmann (2014), referring to the benefits of the weighting by population, states:  
[The unweighted inequality measures] cannot account for the heterogeneity of regions 
with respect to (population) size. This is a very important issue […] due to the lack of a 
 29
uniform territorial classification for all countries […]. In countries with large economic 
differences and a very unequally distributed population, an unweighted inequality 
measure might be difficult to interpret. An example should illustrate the problem. The 
northern Canadian Territories are much poorer than the provinces to the south, so that an 
inequality measure might indicate large economic differences, although very few people 
are actually poor (note that the Territories are inhabited by only 100,000 people in total). 
(Lessmann, 2014, p. 37) 
It is clear that Lessmann’s reasoning in fact relates to inequality of the whole population 
of Canada, and not to inequality between regions. Indeed, adding a very small group of people 
living in the Canadian territories to the huge population of the rest of Canada, overall 
inequality changes only slightly. But this does not mean that there are no economic differences 
between the Canadian territories and provinces. An analogy may be, e.g. earnings inequality 
between generals/admirals and other military personnel in the US Armed Forces. ‘Per capita’ 
salary of the former is al least three times higher than that of the latter, which implies rather 
high inequality. Comparing these ‘per capita’ salaries, why should we care about the 
percentage of generals/admirals in the Armed Forces? Provided that this percentage is very 
small, 0.069% (Kapp, 2016, p. 5), the value of any weighted inequality index will be close to 
zero, thus suggesting no (significant) inequality between generals/admirals and other 
servicemen. Returning to Canada, let us consider actual data reported in Table 10. 
Population of three Canadian territories comprise only 0,33% of the total country’s 
population. Here are the poorest and richest regions of Canada, the difference in incomes per 
capita between them equalling 79%. As compared with the richest region among provinces, 
Alberta, income per capita there is 63% higher than in Nunavut. Contributing to the total 
population one order of magnitude smaller than the Nenets AO in the example from Section 3 
(see Table 4), all three territories much less are able to change the overall income inequality in 
the country. This notwithstanding, the average inhabitant of Nunavut remains 1.6 times poorer 
than the average inhabitant of Alberta. It does not matter a hoot for this fact that they are only 
35 thousand in number. 
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Table 10. Personal income and population in Canada, 2013. 
 
Region Total 
income, 
million 
CAD8 
Population, 
thousand 
people9 
Income 
per 
capita, 
CAD 
Region 
weight 
Region 
weigh 
among 
provinces
Canada 1,222,216 35,102 34,819   
Provinces 1,217,972 34,986 34,813 0.997  
Newfoundland and Labrador  18,027 528 34,158 0.015 0.015
Prince Edward Island  4,241 145 29,228 0.004 0.004
Nova Scotia  29,378 944 31,125 0.027 0.027
New Brunswick  22,693 756 30,025 0.022 0.022
Quebec  257,579 8,144 31,626 0.232 0.233
Ontario  468,655 13,538 34,618 0.386 0.387
Manitoba  38,445 1,264 30,419 0.036 0.036
Saskatchewan  39,114 1,102 35,487 0.031 0.032
Alberta  181,359 3,979 45,577 0.113 0.114
British Columbia  158,481 4,586 34,556 0.131 0.131
Territories 4,244 115 36,832 0.003  
Northwest Territories  1,816 36 50,160 0.001  
Yukon  1,439 44 32,890 0.001  
Nunavut  989 35 28,042 0.001  
Note: CAD = Canadian dollar 
 
Table 11 presents estimates of inequality measures for all Canadian regions and for 
Canadian provinces only, i.e. excluding the northern territories. The unweighted indices 
indicate a decrease in inequality between regions when the territories are deleted from the 
spatial sample (note that only standardized values are comparable across samples, since the 
samples differ in the number of observations). It is quite understandable, as both the richest 
and poorest regions are excluded. The weighted Gini and Theil indices remain invariant, as if 
they measured overall population’s inequality. But they are in no way close to it; the Canadian 
Gini index for 2013 equals 0.358 (varying across provinces from 0.319 to 0.368).10 Thus the 
                                                          
8 Data source: Canada Revenue Agency. Income Statistics 2015 (2013 tax year). Final Table 1. General 
statement by province and territory of taxation. http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/stts/t1fnl/2013/tbl1-eng.pdf 
(Accessed Nov. 21, 2016). Returns from outside Canada are excluded. 
9 Data source: Statistics Canada. Table 051-0005 – Estimates of population, Canada, provinces 
and territories, quarterly (persons). CANSIM database, 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=0510005 (Accessed 
Nov. 21, 2016). Annual average (the arithmetic mean of quarterly estimates). 
10 Data source: Statistics Canada. Table 206-0033 – Gini coefficients of adjusted market, total 
and after-tax income, Canada and provinces, annual. CANSIM database, 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=2060033 (Accessed 
Nov. 21, 2016). 
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weighted Gini index again underestimates both regional and interpersonal inequalities.  
  
Table 11. Estimates of income inequality in Canada.  
 
Index Unweighted Population-weighted  
 Raw Standardized Raw Standardized
All regions 
Coefficient of variation 0.180 0.052 0.120 0.004 
Gini index 0.089 0.096 0.054 0.054 
Theil index 0.015 0.006 0.007 0.001 
Provinces only 
Coefficient of variation 0.133 0.044 0.119 0.008 
Gini index 0.065 0.072 0.054 0.054 
Theil index 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.001 
 
The most interesting is the behaviour of the weighted coefficient of variation. Unlike Gw 
and Thw, it suggests a minor decrease in inequality with elimination of the territories. However, 
the values of CVw are not comparable across samples as the least populated regions (needed to 
normalize CVw by the maximum of 1/1 in ) are different in them. The normalizing factors 
are 0.032 and 0.065 for all Canadian regions and provinces only, respectively. As a result, the 
standardized CVw behaves strikingly; it doubles when the northern territories are eliminated, 
suggesting a rise in inequality. Then what is difficult to interpret, the unweighted or weighted 
coefficient of variation?  
Gisbert (2003) provides reasons similar to Lessmann’s (2014) to defend the relevance of 
the weighting by population in the context of constructing a kernel density of the world 
income distribution. As he points out, 
[Unweighted kernel density] abstracts from the ‘size’ of the different countries. […] 
[T]he world income distribution in terms of countries […] can be highly misleading, for 
example if we drew national borders differently this would affect the shape of the 
densities […]. The natural alternative is to attach a weight to the observations where the 
weights reflects the contribution of each observation in the sample. In our example, per 
capita GDP, the obvious weight is the population (POB) of each country. […] 
[P]opulation is very unevenly distributed among countries; for example China and India, 
two of the poorest countries, account for more than one third of the total population in 
the world, on the other side some of the richest countries, like Iceland or Luxembourg, 
only account for 0.01% of the world population. It does not seem fair to treat all these 
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countries equally in estimation. (Gisbert, 2003, p. 337–338) 
This reasoning again relates to the whole population, this time, of the world. Returning 
to the example of the US Armed Forces, let us draw the ‘border’ in such a way as to add 
colonels/navy captains to generals/admirals. Certainly, the ‘cross-rank’ earnings distribution 
as well as inequality between this group and the group of other servicemen changes, while the 
earning distribution and inequality in the whole US Armed Forces remains intact. However, 
the case at hands is two different phenomena, first, inequality between an (‘average’) high-
rank officer and (‘average’) serviceman with no high rank and the relevant earnings 
distribution, and second, inequality in the whole military personnel and cross-person earnings 
distribution in the US army.    
A standard way of constructing continuous distribution from a set of m discrete 
observations is a kernel density estimator (Silverman, 1986). It is defined as (in notation of 
this paper): 
h
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yy
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yf m
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i /)(1)(
1   ,            (11) 
where h is the smoothing bandwidth which depends on the number of observations, m, as well 
as on parameters of the source distribution (yi); K() is a kernel function. Considering regions 
instead of countries, f(y) is an estimate of cross-region income distribution (to be exact, the 
probability density). Based on his reasoning, Gisbert (2003) modifies Formula (11) in the 
following way: 
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This formula resembles Formula (7) in Section 3. The similarity is not formal; the 
essence of Formulae (7) and (12) is the same. Both approximate cross-person income 
distribution in the whole territory consisting of m territorial units. The difference is in that the 
delta function representing within-region income distribution gi(y) in Formula (7) is replaced 
by an arbitrary – with respect to the actual within-region distribution – function )(* ygi  in 
Formula (12). A number of functions can serve as the kernel in Formulae (11) and (12). To be 
specific, employ the Epanechnikov kernel: )
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+ h, yi – h], otherwise 0)( yK Ei . Then hyKyg Eii /)()(*  . Figure 7 shows such proxies of 
the regional income distributions (in the left panel) and income distribution of the whole 
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population (in the right panel) as applied to the example of the Tyumen Oblast from Section 3. 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 25 50 75 100
Income, thousand RUR
D
en
si
ty
*1
,0
00
y 3 y 2y 1
g* 2(y )g* 3(y )
g* 1(y )
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 25 50 75 100
Income, thousand RUR
D
en
si
ty
*1
,0
00
g* 0(y )f 0(y )
(a) Subregions of the Tyumen Oblast (b) The Tyumen Oblast as a whole 
 
Figure 7. Proxies of income distributions in the Tyumen Oblasts. 
Note: f0(y) is drawn from Figure 4 (d). 
   
In this example, h = 22.756. It artificially ‘imputes’ income dispersion to regions; as a 
result, ))(( *0 ygCV , ))((
*
0 ygG  and ))((
*
0 ygTh  are not equal to CVw, Gw and Thw, respectively. 
Nonetheless, the former also do not provide adequate estimates of population’s income 
inequality. Comparing Figure 7 (a) with Figure 4 (c), it is seen that the ‘imputed’ regional 
distributions )(* ygi  are far from being similar to the actual distributions fi(y). Owing to this, 
their weighted sum (weighted kernel density estimate) )(*0 yg  is a severely distorted proxy of 
the actual population income distribution f0(y) as Figure 7 (b) evidences. 
Petrakos et al. (2005, p. 1839–1840) derive need for the population weighting from a 
critique of the -convergence methodology. According to them, analysis of -convergence can 
distort the perception of convergence trends, since it neglects relative sizes of regions. To 
illustrate this statement, the authors offer a simple three-region example. Table 12 tabulates 
this example (Petrakos et al., 2005, p. 1840), supplementing it with estimates of different 
inequality measures, both unweighted and population-weighted. Among them,  stands for the 
standard deviation of log income and w is its population-weighted counterpart.   
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Table 12. Inequality estimates in Petrakos’ et al. (2005) example. 
 
Region Population n y(t) y(t+), 
scenario 1 
y(t+), 
scenario 2 
A 4.0 0.714 20 25 25 
B 1.5 0.268 14 15 15 
C 0.1 0.018 6 7 8 
)(wy    18.143 22.000 22.018 
CV / CVw   0.430 / 0.172 0.470 / 0.221 0.436 / 0.218 
G / Gw   0.233 / 0.075 0.255 / 0.099 0.236 / 0.098 
 / w   0.505 / 0.215 0.523 / 0.271 0.466 / 0.261 
Th / Thw    0.100  / 0.017 0.115 / 0.027 0.097 / 0.026 
 
The initial state, y(t), is compared with a final state, y(t+), under two scenarios. 
Regarding scenario 1, both -convergence analysis and all inequality indices unambiguously 
indicate income divergence. However, -convergence occurs under scenario 2, while CVw 
suggests divergence. Petrakos et al. (2005) assign this to the fact that fast growth of small 
region C (by 33%) blurs the picture when all regions are treated as equal, whereas CVw 
accounts properly for the relative importance of region C and therefore adequately indicates 
divergence. However, the unweighted indices CV and G also indicate divergence under 
scenario 2. At the same time,  and Th suggest convergence. Hence the weighting is not the 
case; the point is that specific inequality measures differ in sensitivity to changes in income 
distribution (Lambert, 2001). As for -convergence, it results from diminishing   under 
scenario 2. Wodon & Yitzhaki (2006) prove that from -convergence follows -convergence 
(but the converse is not true: -convergence does not necessary implies -convergence). All 
weighted inequality indices, indeed, indicate divergence under scenario 2. However, this is a 
particular case. For example, if population of region C were 1 instead 0.1, w would suggest 
convergence, being equal to 0.451 in the initial state and 0.439 under scenario 2. 
The above considerations show that supporters of the weighting by population confuse 
inequality between regions (i.e. between representative inhabitants of regions) and the overall 
interpersonal inequality. According to them, the population weights should reflect the 
contribution of each territorial unit. But, contribution to what? They interpret it as a 
contribution to inequality between regions, while in fact it is a contribution to inequality 
between all inhabitants of the set of territorial units under consideration. 
Studies on international inequality also widely use the population-weighted indices. 
From all appearances, economists engaged in studies of international inequality ‘reinvented’ 
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Williamson’s approach. In contrast to regional researchers (who sometimes perform 
international studies as well), they are aware of the conceptual distinction between unweighted 
and population-weighted inequality indices, explicitly interpreting the latter as approximate 
measures of inequality among the world population, and not between nations. A surprising 
thing is that as if there is a barrier between the literature on regional inequality and that on 
international inequality. The former almost never references to the latter (Akita et al., 2011, 
can be mentioned as one of extremely rare examples). The conversance with the literature on 
international inequality would surely prevent regional researchers from misinterpreting the 
population-weighted indices as measures of regional inequality. 
While the literature on regional inequality does not discuss need for the population 
weighting in inequality indices, getting by short notes like those cited throughout this paper, 
the literature on international inequality widely debates the question ‘To weight or not to 
weight?’. Both viewpoints are considered in detail by e.g. Firebaugh (2003) and Ravallion 
(2005). Under interpretation of the population-weighted estimates as proxies of inequality 
among the world population, the arguments in favour of weighting look reasonable; at least, 
they are seriously substantiated.  
However, the results of applying the population-weighted indices for estimation of 
global inequality are disappointing as, e.g., results due to Milanovic (2012) cited in the end of 
Section 2 suggest. This is of no surprise in the light of the above exposition. As Milanovic 
(2005, p. 10) notices, population-weighted inequality “deals neither only with nations nor 
individuals but falls somewhere in between” (in fact, this is not always true; it may fall below 
the both as examples of Russia in Table 5 and Canada in Table 11 evidence). He also accepts 
that it may be misleading (Milanovic, 2012, p. 8). Worse yet, it follows from this paper that 
this is the prevailing situation.   
The debate regarding the population weighting in the literature on international 
inequality focuses on the issue of what an adequate characterization of inequality in the world 
is, either inter-country inequality or interpersonal inequality among the world population. In 
my view, this debate is fairly pointless. It must be agreed with Firebaugh (2003), who notes 
that the answer depends on the goal: 
[T]he issue of unweighted versus weighted between-nation inequality reduces to this 
question: are we interested in between-nation income inequality because of what it tells 
us about the average difference between nations’ income ratios, or because of what it 
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tells us about the average difference between individuals’ income ratios? (Firebaugh, 
2003, p. 129) 
Assume that a regional research correctly interprets the population-weighted inequality 
indices as approximate estimates of national inequality, and not regional inequality. Is it 
reasonable to apply them? It is the lack of relevant data that forces to use these indices in 
studies on international inequality. However, such roundabout way in relation to a single 
country does not make sense. Nowadays, many national statistical agencies report data on 
personal-income distributions in their countries. Estimating national inequality even through 
so rough distribution as consisting of quintile income classes, we obtain much more adequate 
results than those based on the cross-region income distribution. 
At last, one more issue needs to be touched upon. Exploring determinants of regional 
inequality with the use of population-weighted inequality indices, some authors, e.g. Kyriacou 
& Roca-Sagalés (2014) and Lessmann (2014), also employ unweighted indices for robustness 
checks. Such a way seems contradictory. On the one hand, if the authors believe unweighted 
measures to distort perception of inequality, then why should these measures confirm results 
obtained with the use of ‘adequate’ measures? On the other hand, if they do confirm, then why 
do we need the weighting?       
 
6. Conclusions 
Following Williamson (1965), many economists estimate regional inequality with the use of 
indices weighted by regions’ shares in the national population. Analysis in this paper shows 
that this approach is conceptually inconsistent. Instead of an estimate of regional inequality, 
we get a rough estimate of interpersonal inequality among the whole population of the country 
(and this estimate makes sense only if it deals with indicators applicable to an individual). 
Therefore the population-weighted estimates of inequality are biased with regard to estimates of 
both regional inequality (as they measure a different value) and interpersonal inequality (as they 
do not and cannot take account of within-region income disparities). In both cases, the result may 
be not only distorted, but also quite misleading. Thus the population-weighted inequality indices 
never give adequate results. 
Moreover, the population-weighted inequality indices do not satisfy requirements for an 
adequate inequality measure. They violate three of four basic axioms, the population, anonymity 
and transfer principles. This may lead to estimates of inequality evolution that contradict common 
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sense. One more consequence is the absence of unambiguous maxima of the population-weighted 
inequality indices. This makes it impossible to standardize estimates of inequality with the aim of 
cross-time or cross-country comparability.  
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